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ARTICLES
Shapelessness and the Thick*
Debbie Roberts
This article aims to clarify the view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick.
I do this by putting the disentangling argument in its place and then setting
out what nonreductivists about the thick are committed to. To distinguish the
view from possible reductive accounts, defenders of irreducible thickness are,
I argue, committed to the claim that evaluative concepts and properties are
nonevaluatively shapeless. This in turn requires a commitment to (radical)
holism and particularism. Nonreductivists are also committed to the claim that
a thick concept is in itself evaluative, and not evaluative because of any link
to thin evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent surge of interest in thick concepts.1 My aim
in this article is to clarify a prominent position in the debate: the view
that thick concepts are irreducibly thick. This is usually further char-
acterized metaphorically and negatively as the view that there can be
no disentangling of the deeply entangled evaluative and nonevaluative
elements that make up thick conceptual content. My strategy is to
* A previous version of this article was presented at the 2009 BSET conference at
the University of Reading, and I am grateful to the participants for helpful discussion.
For helpful comments on previous drafts, I am grateful to Max de Gaynesford, Matti
Eklund, Daniel Elstein, Brad Hooker, James Lenman, David McNaughton, Derek Parfit,
and Pekka Va¨yrynen, and to two referees and seven editors for this journal. I am also
grateful to Jamie Dreier for editorial guidance. I am especially grateful to Jonathan Dancy
and Guy Fletcher.
1. See, e.g., Daniel Y. Elstein and Thomas Hurka, “From Thick to Thin: Two Moral
Reduction Plans,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2009): 515–35; Pekka Va¨yrynen, “Ob-
jectionable Thick Concepts in Denials,” Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 439–69; Simon
Kirchin, “The Shapelessness Hypothesis,” Philosophers’ Imprint 10 (2010), http://
www.philosophersimprint.org/010004; Matti Eklund, “What Are Thick Concepts?” Cana-
dian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).
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unpack this metaphor and thereby give a positive statement of the
view.
In the literature, the claim that thick concepts are irreducibly
thick is held to be important because of what is supposed to follow
from it. It is irreducible thickness that, some think, wreaks havoc with
the fact-value distinction. It is also supposed to create problems for
noncognitivism, problems for those who think that all moral judg-
ments can be expressed using a few thin moral concepts such as good,
bad, right, and wrong, and even problems for the idea that the
evaluative in general supervenes on the nonevaluative. But exactly
what irreducible thickness is remains elusive. Many admit to finding
the notion somewhat dark.2
This is an unfortunate state of affairs. Understanding the nature
of the thick is important for understanding the nature of the evaluative:
for answering such questions as what it is for a concept to be evaluative,
what the evaluative should be contrasted with, what it is to be compe-
tent with an evaluative concept, and what we should take the evaluative
to supervene and depend on. If thick concepts are irreducibly thick,
this has significance wherever there is thick evaluation.3 Moreover, if
thick concepts are irreducibly thick, we cannot assume that their rela-
tion to certain thin concepts is analytic or conceptual. This raises po-
tentially unsettling questions for all those normative theories formu-
lated using only thin moral terms. In addition, the accounts we can
give of particular ethical concepts like friendship, justice, courage,
and impartiality will be dramatically affected if these concepts are
irreducibly thick.4 Given these implications, and the prominence of the
2. These include people currently working on thick concepts. See, e.g., Eklund, “What
Are Thick Concepts?” Elijah Millgram makes a related point in “Thick Ethical Concepts
and the Fact-Value Distinction,” published as “Inhaltsreiche ethische Begriffe und die
Unterscheidund zwischen Tatsachen undWerten,” in Zum moralischen Denken, ed. C. Fehige
and G. Meggle (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995), 354–88. Millgram argues that the “Thick
Ethical Concept Argument” against the fact-value distinction, while frequently invoked,
has never actually been made. He does not go on to give an account of the irreducibly
thick, however. Jonathan Dancy gives the most comprehensive account of the irreducibly
thick in “In Defense of Thick Concepts,” inMidwest Studies in Philosophy XX: Moral Concepts,
ed. P. A. French et al. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 263–79,
but this article is both extremely dense and insufficiently discussed.
3. Beyond metaethics, thick concepts are discussed in aesthetics. Increasingly, they
are also discussed in epistemology; see, e.g., JeremyWanderer and Ben Kotzee, eds., “Thick
and Thin Concepts in Epistemology,” special issue, Philosophical Papers 37 (2008).
4. Proper discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this article, but it is worth
pointing out that the nature of thick concepts also affects whether normative ethical
theories should aim to be universal, or whether they should be rooted in particular forms
of life. The issue thus has implications beyond normative ethics, for example, for debates
about communitarianism in political philosophy.
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view in the debate about the thick, it is worth getting clear on just what
irreducible thickness is.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Sections II and III set the
scene with some preliminary remarks and an initial outline of the
distinction between thick and thin. In Section IV, I discuss the dis-
entangling argument (DA).5 The disentangling argument, often at-
tributed to John McDowell, is taken to be the main argument in the
literature against reductive views of thick concepts—views that hold
that the evaluative and nonevaluative elements that make up thick
conceptual content can be disentangled by analysis. Those who think
that the disentangling argument succeeds take it to be a reason for
holding that thick concepts are irreducibly thick.6 If this argument
does succeed, we might expect it to provide insight into what irre-
ducible thickness is. I argue, though, that the disentangling argument
does not succeed as a general argument against reductive views of the
thick and thus that it is not a reason to hold that thick concepts are
irreducibly thick. More importantly for my purposes, the disentan-
gling argument does not serve to clarify what irreducible thickness is.
However, help is at hand if we return to the original remarks that
gave rise to the disentangling argument. Section V shows, contrary to
what appears to have been assumed in the literature on the thick, that
McDowell’s antidisentangling remarks in his “Non-cognitivism and
Rule-Following” do not especially concern the thick; their primary
point is not about the analyzability of thick concepts, but it is about
the nature of evaluation in general. The fact that these antidisentan-
gling remarks are about the nature of evaluation in general, however,
does not mean that they cannot be useful in explicating the notion of
the irreducibly thick. Section VI shows how this is so, and develops in
detail just what a nonreductivist about the thick is committed to. It
turns out, I argue, that commitment to irreducible thickness involves
commitment to a view of the nature of evaluation in general. In Section
VII, I explore some of the implications of this account, and I conclude
by considering the implications for the fact-value distinction.
5. “Disentangling argument” is perhaps an unfortunate label, as it is supposed to be
an argument against disentangling, rather than for it. I use this label, however, as it is
established in the literature.
6. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1985); Dancy, “In Defense of Thick Concepts”; Hilary Putnam,
“The Entanglement of Fact and Value,” in The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other
Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 28–45; and Charles Taylor, “Ethics
and Ontology,” Journal of Philosophy 100 (2003): 302–20.
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II. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
In order to clear the way for my discussion, it will be helpful to in-
dicate how certain complexities will be negotiated.
A. The Relation of the Debate about the Nature of Thick Concepts to the
Debate between Cognitivism and Noncognitivism
In the early literature on thick concepts, the disentangling argument
is primarily deployed within the context of the broader debate be-
tween cognitivism and noncognitivism. There are two points to note
here. First, while it is important to keep this context in mind in order
to appreciate the primary point of McDowell’s antidisentangling re-
marks, the primary point of this current article is not to offer an
argument against noncognitivism. The primary point of this article is
to clarify the view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick, and to
indicate what defenders of this view are committed to.
Second, it is not obvious that the view that thick concepts are
irreducibly thick must be a cognitivist view, as has been assumed. In-
deed, we cannot legislate in advance that cognitivists must be non-
reductivists and noncognitivists reductivists about the thick. Christine
Tappolet, Daniel Elstein, and Tom Hurka have recently pointed out
that both cognitivists and noncognitivists can be reductivists.7 Fur-
thermore, it may be that noncognitivists can be nonreductivists about
the thick. Whether they can or not depends, as I argue in Sections
VII and VIII, on whether noncognitivists can be particularists, and on
whether a nonreductivist noncognitivist view can account for the su-
pervenience and dependence of the evaluative on the nonevaluative.
B. The ‘Evaluative’ and the ‘Descriptive’
The debate about the nature of thick concepts has been cast in terms
of a contrast between the ‘evaluative’ and the ‘descriptive’. While we
do need to contrast the evaluative with something, it is far from ob-
vious that the descriptive is the right candidate. If we contrast the
evaluative with the descriptive, we obscure the possibility that to eval-
uate something might also be to describe it, when for the purposes
of the debate we should use a way of drawing the contrast that is
neutral between cognitivism and noncognitivism. Also, I will need to
talk of the features of the world on which the evaluative is held to
depend. While some will be happy to call these features ‘descriptive’
7. Christine Tappolet, “Through Thick and Thin: Good and Its Determinates,”Dialecta
58 (2004): 214; Elstein and Hurka, “From Thick to Thin,” 516–17. However, while these
writers acknowledge, contrary to what the literature on the thick seems to assume, that
cognitivists can be reductivists about the thick, they also hold that it can be legislated in
advance that noncognitivists must be reductivists.
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there is something odd about this: it is bits of language that describe,
and are descriptive, rather than features of the world. It is similarly
odd to call properties descriptive. Similar considerations apply to a
factual/evaluative contrast.
It may seem as if the obvious way to proceed here is to contrast
the ‘evaluative’ with the ‘natural’, but this is also problematic. First,
while there is nothing wrong with calling features or properties of the
world ‘natural’, it is odd to talk of the natural, as opposed to the
evaluative, content of a concept. Second, as with the contrast between
the evaluative and the descriptive, the distinction between the ‘eval-
uative’ and the ‘natural’ obscures, at least, the possibility that the
evaluative might be natural. And third, there are difficult issues re-
garding how the natural should be characterized. While these issues
are interesting and important, they are also a complication that can
be ignored for present purposes.
A further option is simply to draw the contrast with the noneval-
uative, and this is the option that I take. This version of the contrast
has a number of advantages in the present context. First, it is ex-
haustive and exclusive where the others are not. Second, we can talk
of both nonevaluative content and nonevaluative features without
strain. Third, there are no separate difficulties about how to charac-
terize the nonevaluative in the way that there are about the natural.
C. Dependence and Supervenience
Most metaethicists agree that some dependence relationship holds
between the evaluative and the nonevaluative: things get to be the
way they are evaluatively because of, or in virtue of, the way they are
nonevaluatively.8 In metaethics, this dependence relationship is often
expressed as the claim that the evaluative supervenes on the non-
evaluative. Strictly speaking, however, supervenience claims are co-
variance rather than dependence claims. In this context, the super-
venience claim in slogan form is that there can be no evaluative
difference without a nonevaluative difference.9
8. This is sometimes expressed by saying that evaluative properties are not free-float-
ing. Different theories give different accounts of the nature of the dependence. One
might hold that evaluative properties ontologically depend on nonevaluative properties
or that evaluative responses somehow depend on beliefs about the nonevaluative, to men-
tion only two examples (and these are not meant to be mutually exclusive). What I say
should be construed as neutral between different accounts of the dependence relationship,
except when otherwise indicated.
9. This by itself is not sufficient to establish that the evaluative depends on the non-
evaluative. A-properties (A-judgments) can supervene on B-properties (B-judgments)
without the A-properties (A-judgments) depending on the B properties (B-judgments),
since all that is required is covariance. See Brian P. McLaughlin, “Varieties of Superven-
ience,” in Supervenience: New Essays, ed. Elias E. Savellos and U. Yalcin (Cambridge: Cam-
494 Ethics April 2011
One of the issues that will be raised by the discussion of this
article is whether irreducible thickness presents a challenge to the
dependence and supervenience theses. Without wishing to spoil the
ending, it will turn out that irreducible thickness (and its attendant
view of evaluation) is no threat to the dependence thesis if that thesis
is construed ontologically. Whether it is a threat to the supervenience
thesis depends too on how that thesis is construed, but the issues here
are trickier. I discuss this in detail in Section VII.10
D. Concepts and Meanings
Finally, the issue regarding the reducibility of thick concepts is some-
times characterized as the issue of whether a thick concept can be
analyzed into a nonevaluative component and a thin evaluative com-
ponent, and sometimes as the issue of whether the meaning of a thick
term can be analyzed into a nonevaluative meaning component and
a thin evaluative meaning component. Herein I assume that concepts
are at the level of sense rather than at the level of reference. I also
assume that thick terms express thick concepts, and that the thick
concept is what we grasp when we understand the thick term. Thus,
for the purposes of this article, I take it that the meaning of a thick
term, such as ‘tactful’, is much the same thing as the content of the
concept—tactful—expressed by that term.
With these preliminaries out of the way, we can now move onto
an initial characterization of the distinction between thick and thin
evaluative concepts.
III. THICK AND THIN: AN INITIAL SENSE OF THE DISTINCTION
1. The recent film adaptation of Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Re-
visited is bad.
2. “Sadly, Julian Jarrold’s big-screen Brideshead Revisited . . . is
dull, perfunctory and moderately efficient. . . . At the centre is a
dim performance from Matthew Goode as Charles Ryder.”11
bridge University Press, 1995), 16–59. Compare Nicholas Sturgeon, “Doubts about the
Supervenience of the Evaluative,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 4, ed. Russ Shafer-
Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 60.
10. Up until Sec. VII, what I say about supervenience should be understood to be
neutral between ascriptive (evaluative judgments supervene on nonevaluative judgments)
and ontological supervenience (evaluative properties supervene on nonevaluative prop-
erties), since the discussion is neutral between cognitivism and noncognitivism. See James
C. Klagge, “Supervenience: Ontological and Ascriptive,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
66 (1988): 461–70. I discuss both ascriptive and ontological supervenience in detail in
Sec. VII. My thanks to a referee for pointing out the importance of this distinction for
my discussion.
11. Philip French, “Brideshead Revisited,” Observer, October, 5, 2008, http://
www.guardian.co.uk/film/2008/oct/05/periodandhistorical.drama (emphasis added).
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“It’s a dutiful, good-looking slice of heritage cinema so empty
that you expect Keira Knightley to show up at any minute.”12
We can call the evaluative concept in (1) ‘thin’ and those in (2)
‘thick’. It is clear that (1) and (2) are both evaluations, but it is also
clear that they are different. Thick evaluations are more specific than
thin evaluations. It is perhaps tempting to attempt to explain this
difference by saying that (1) is a thin evaluation because it uses a
concept that is purely evaluative and that (2) is a thick evaluation
because it uses concepts like dull, perfunctory, empty, and dim
that both evaluate the relevant object and ascribe certain non-
evaluative features to it.13 Those who are so tempted are usually fur-
ther tempted to say that the distinction between thin and thick can
be drawn in terms of content: thin concepts have a unitary character
in virtue of having purely evaluative content; thick concepts, on the
other hand, have a dual character in virtue of having some combi-
nation of evaluative and nonevaluative content.
This seemingly dual character has led some philosophers to think
that thickness is generated by a combination of elements, elements
that can in principle be separated by analysis. According to these phi-
losophers, thickness is reducible in the sense that the elements that
generate thickness can be disentangled.14 The simplest form of such
a reduction would be a two-component analysis of a thick concept.
One component would be a thin evaluation, the other a specification
of the nonevaluative features things must have if they are to merit the
thin evaluation. However, two-component analyses do not simply con-
junctively combine nonevaluation and evaluation. The view is not that
a thick evaluative term like ‘tactful’ can be analyzed into some non-
evaluative predicate ‘T’ (ascribing a specific nonevaluative property
or set of properties) and some evaluative predicate, for example,
12. Sukhdev Sandhu, “Brideshead Revisited: Brideshead Redecorated,” Telegraph, Oc-
tober, 2, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/film/filmreviews/3561525/Brides
head-Revisited-Brideshead-redecorated.html (emphasis added).
13. I will use small caps to indicate concepts and single quotes to indicate terms.
Throughout the article, I talk of thick concepts and thick evaluative concepts as if thick
evaluative concepts exhaust all the thick concepts there are. There may also be thick
deontic concepts, however.
14. This quick sketch of a reductive view is not meant as an accurate representation
of all reductive views. There are those, notably Simon Blackburn, whose reductive view
of the thick is not accurately represented as a view about the analyzability of thick concepts.
Blackburn holds that there are no thick concepts, only loaded terms, that is, that the
evaluative aspect of a so-called thick term is no part of the content of the concept expressed
by that term. However, it is still accurate to characterize Blackburn as holding that the
elements that generate the appearance of thickness can be disentangled. Given the aims
of this article, I will largely ignore the complications introduced by Blackburn’s view.
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‘good’. This is because an analysis that was merely conjunctive would
not capture an aspect of what is conveyed by ‘tactful’: that it is due to
its being T that the action is good. Thus, a two-component analysis of
‘tactful’ would have to say something like: “x is tactful if and only if
x is T and is good in virtue of being T.”
This is the simplest reductive account of the thick, and it is
against this that Bernard Williams and Hilary Putnam, among others,
have wielded the disentangling argument.
IV. THE DISENTANGLING ARGUMENT
The disentangling argument as it is presented in the literature on the
thick is supposed to scupper the chances of such two-component anal-
yses.15 Some have even suggested that it shows that evaluation and
nonevaluation are so deeply entangled in the content of thick con-
cepts that the separation a reductive analysis requires is impossible.16
However, the argument achieves neither of these things. It is only if
this two-component analysis is combined with a certain view of the
nature of evaluation that it is vulnerable to the disentangling argu-
ment.17 Moreover, there are other forms that reductive analyses of the
thick can take that are not vulnerable to the disentangling argu-
ment.18
In this section, I set out the argument and then go on to discuss
three different versions of reductive analyses for thick concepts. I ar-
gue that the disentangling argument succeeds against two-component
reductive analyses that hold the nonevaluative component of the anal-
ysis to be extensionally equivalent to the thick concept (RA1). These
analyses accept universalizability and codifiability. However, the ar-
gument fails against two-component reductive analyses that deny univ-
ersalizability and codifiability (RA2). And it also fails against reductive
analyses that endorse universalizability and codifiability but allow that
15. This is the disentangling argument as it is presented in the literature on thick
concepts by, for example, Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 140–42; Putnam,
“Entanglement of Fact and Value,” 38–39; Taylor, “Ethics and Ontology,” 360; Millgram,
“Thick Ethical Concepts,” sec. 2; Dancy, “In Defense of Thick Concepts,” 263; and Elstein
and Hurka, “From Thick to Thin,” 518. McDowell is cited as the source of the argument,
except in Dancy’s case. I argue below that it is misleading to suggest that McDowell himself
makes this argument.
16. Putnam, “Entanglement of Fact and Value,” 34. Compare Williams, Ethics and the
Limits of Philosophy, 129.
17. I disagree here with Elstein and Hurka, “From Thick to Thin,” who suggest that
all versions of this form of two-component analysis will be vulnerable to the disentangling
argument.
18. It is worth pointing out that I am not claiming that these reductive strategies are
ultimately successful, merely that they do not run aground on the disentangling argument.
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the nonevaluative meaning component of an analysis of a thick term
does not fully specify the set of nonevaluative properties that make
the application of the relevant thick predicate appropriate (RA3). To
see all this, we must first consider the argument.
A. The Disentangling Argument
If the two-component reductive view of the thick were correct, it is
said, an outsider who did not share the relevant evaluative point of
view would be able to grasp the extension of the thick concept (and
so come to mimic the practice of insiders regarding the application
of this concept) merely by observing the nonevaluative features of
different cases of the concept’s correct application. But, it is con-
tended, it is not plausible to suppose that an outsider could achieve
this. The support for the claim that it is not plausible to suppose that
an outsider could achieve this comes from the plausible thought that
the extension of a thick concept cannot be determined without mak-
ing some evaluations, that is, without sharing the insiders’ evaluative
point of view. If this is the case, the argument concludes, it is not
plausible to suppose that the two-component reductive view of the
thick is correct.19
If we grant that it is indeed the case that we cannot determine
the extension of a thick concept without making some evaluations,20
this argument is successful against accounts of the thick like those of
R. M. Hare and C. L. Stevenson, which hold that nonevaluative ex-
tensionally equivalent terms are available for thick terms, and that it
is the nonevaluative meaning of thick terms that drives their appli-
cation from case to case. To use Williams’s terminology, on these ac-
counts it is the nonevaluative meaning component alone that guides
the application of these terms to the world.21
Consider the two-component analysis of ‘tactful’ again, the first
and simplest form of a reductive analysis for thick concepts:
RA1: x is tactful if and only if x is T (where ‘T’ is a nonevaluative
19. The argument is deliberately cautiously phrased. This is faithful to its presentation
in the literature and is what allows the different interpretations of it that I go on to discuss.
It strikes some as obviously a bad argument. It is certainly not a good argument if it is
meant to be an argument against reductivism about the thick in general, or an argument
for irreducible thickness.
20. For the purposes of this article I take it that this is indeed the case. All of the
positions discussed here except for those of R. M. Hare and C. L. Stevenson accept this
claim, though they do not each interpret it in the same way.
21. C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944),
chap. 3; R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 121;Williams,
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 141. Given universalizability, this is true once the evaluation
has been made for the first time. See n. 22.
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predicate referring to a specific set of nonevaluative properties)
and x is good in virtue of being T.
On Hare’s view, given his commitment to universalizability, once I
have judged that something is good in virtue of being T, I am logically
bound to judge good anything else that I judge to be T.22 ‘T’, on
Hare’s view, can be employed to pick out all those things to which I
would apply ‘tactful’. It follows that, for Hare, a nonevaluative exten-
sionally equivalent term is available for any thick term. This version
of the reductive view thus holds exactly what the disentangling argu-
ment says is impossible: an outsider could come to mimic the insiders’
practice with a thick term simply by attending to the nonevaluative
features of different cases of the thick term’s correct application.
Since these features would neatly repeat from case to case, judgments
regarding when a particular thick term applies would be easily codifi-
able.
B. A Version of the Two-Component Analysis That Escapes the DA
However, a defender of the two-component analysis is not necessarily
committed to holding that the nonevaluative component of a thick
concept can be expressed by a nonevaluative term that is extensionally
equivalent to the thick term. According to the general version of the
analysis, a person or an action must not only be T but must also be
good in virtue of being T, in order to count as tactful. The two-com-
ponent analysis is therefore compatible with the plausible thought
that we cannot determine the extension of a thick term without mak-
ing some evaluations. It is possible, on this analysis, that an action
can be T (and even good) and yet not be tactful because it is not also
good in virtue of being T.23 A defender of the two-component analysis
could drop Hare’s universalizability requirement and claim that, if
something is T, whether that thing is also good in virtue of being T
is dependent on context. Thus, if I judge that an action is T, I am
not logically bound to judge that it is good. However, the nature of
the contextual dependence of the goodness of T would have to be
uncodifiable. If it were codifiable into a manageable and useful set of
finite principles, there would be no reason to hold that the non-
evaluative component of the concept was ‘T’ rather than ‘T!’, where
22. For R. M. Hare, a judgment is universalizable when “it logically commits the
speaker to making a similar judgment about anything which is either exactly like the
subject of the original judgment, or like it in the relevant respects” (Freedom and Reason
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963], 139). I take it that “like it in the relevant respects”
means in the case of evaluative judgments that the thing shares the nonevaluative features
that were the speaker’s reasons for making the original judgment.
23. Compare Tappolet, “Through Thick and Thin,” 214–15.
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‘T!’ would be ‘T’ plus the principles detailing the nature of the con-
textual dependence. ‘T!’ would once again be a nonevaluative com-
ponent extensionally equivalent to ‘tactful’, and thus the analysis
would again fall foul of the disentangling argument. Dropping both
universalizability and codifiability would thus result in a two-compo-
nent analysis that was compatible with the plausible thought that we
cannot determine the extension of a thick term without making some
evaluations.
I will label this form of reductive analysis, a two-component anal-
ysis that denies universalizability and codifiability, RA2.
RA2: x is tactful if and only if x is T (where ‘T’ is a nonevaluative
predicate referring to a specific set of nonevaluative properties)
and x is good in virtue of being T, and whether x is good in
virtue of being T is uncodifiably dependent upon context such
that universalizability with regard to T is not possible.
This is roughly the form that Blackburn’s response to the disentan-
gling argument takes (he combines it with a claim about evaluation
being no part of the meaning of thick terms). Fattists, he says, may
choose to overlook the fact Pavarotti was fat to an extent that would
normally repel them because he was “so transcendentally uncontemp-
tible in other ways.” The evaluation, in other words, can play a role
in determining the extension of the term ‘fat ’ as said with a sneerf
by fattists. A person must not only be fat; it must also be the case that
a ‘ ’ is called for: “It is quite compatible with attitude being carriedf
by the tone, that it then play a role in determining the extension and
ruling out of the extension things which, for quite different reasons,
escape the attitude.”24 For it to truly capture that it is evaluation doing
the work here, the analysis must have it that the things that can count
as reasons for ruling some fat people out of the extension of ‘fat ’f
are uncodifiable. If the analysis held that these reasons were codifia-
ble, the nonevaluative component would be ‘fat!’ rather than ‘fat’,
and evaluative judgments with respect to ‘fat!’ would be universaliz-
able. We would again have an analysis that produced a nonevaluative
term extensionally equivalent to the thick term, and the disentangling
argument would again have purchase.
C. Other Reductive Analyses That Escape the DA
A defender of a reductive account of the thick need not deny univ-
ersalizability and codifiability. She need not deny that there is some
24. Simon Blackburn, “Through Thick and Thin,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volume 66 (1992): 290. Of course, we need not give the expressivist spin to
this point.
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finite set of nonevaluative properties such that whenever they are in-
stantiated, the thing they are instantiated by is good (or bad) in virtue
of those properties, and therefore that the thick predicate in question
applies to that thing.25 She need only deny that that set of non-
evaluative properties is specified in the meaning of a thick term. She
thus denies that a reductive analysis is possible that would yield a
nonevaluative component with the same extension as the thick term.26
If this strategy is to be compatible with, and so evade, the dis-
entangling argument, then that argument needs to be interpreted in
a particular way. According to that argument, it is implausible that an
outsider (someone who did not make the relevant evaluations) could
come to mimic the practice of insiders with regard to a particular
thick concept. The way this point is most commonly made is to ques-
tion the possibility of there being a nonevaluative term that is exten-
sionally equivalent to the thick term.27 On this second strategy for
avoiding the disentangling argument, it would not be the case that
there could never be a nonevaluative term that is extensionally equiv-
alent to the thick term, nor could it be that it is impossible for an
outsider to come to mimic the practice of insiders. (For, according to
this strategy, there is a set of nonevaluative properties such that each
time it is instantiated it makes the thick concept applicable.) Instead,
the idea must be that it is very unlikely that an outsider could come
to mimic the practice of insiders while remaining an outsider.
On this strategy, the claim must be that it is very likely that an
outsider will have to engage with the evaluations of the insiders in
order to be able to apply the concept correctly, because it is too dif-
ficult to detect the set of nonevaluative properties present in each
25. For simplicity’s sake, I have put this in terms of properties, but the same point
could just as easily be made in terms of judgments.
26. Elstein and Hurka, “From Thick to Thin,” give two strategies for reduction of
this sort, one two-part and one three-part with an embedded thin evaluation. They hold
the nonevaluative component “specifies good- or right-making properties to some degree
but not completely, saying only that they must be of some specified general type but not
selecting specific properties within that type—that is left to evaluation” (ibid., 521). What
makes it plausible that their strategies are reductivist yet nonetheless accept universaliz-
ability and codifiability is that none of the nonevaluative meaning component is held to
be determinate or specific. Once some is, as in Blackburn’s ‘fat ’ example, if codifiabilityf
is accepted, it is not clear what rationale there is for restricting the nonevaluative meaning
component to ‘fat’ rather than allowing it to be ‘fat!’. Thus, it is not clear what rationale
there is for rejecting universalizability with regard to ‘fat!’, and for rejecting the claim
that there is a nonevaluative extensionally equivalent term for ‘fat ’.f
27. David Wiggins makes it briefly and with a pleasing rhetorical flourish: “In any
case, who can seriously believe that there is any chance of giving the ‘ethically uncom-
mitted’ or ‘pure’ description that ‘scoundrel’ and ‘knave’ piggy-back upon?’” (Ethics: Twelve
Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006], 379).
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case of the concept’s correct application directly (that is, without go-
ing through the evaluations the concept is used to make). This is
compatible with being able to reductively analyze the content of a
thick concept into a thin evaluative component (or components) and
a nonevaluative component. The nonevaluative component, however,
will not fully specify the set of nonevaluative properties things must
have in order to fall under the concept. It will only characterize what
nonevaluative sort they must be.
Sticking with ‘tactful’ as an example, ‘tactful’ on this view might
be analyzed as something like:
RA3: x is tactful if and only if x is good and there are properties
P, Q, and R (unspecified) of nonevaluative sort T (specified)
such that x has properties P, Q, and R, and P, Q, and R make
anything that has them good.
‘T’ might be something like “having something to do with showing
concern for the feelings of others.”28
To sum up the discussion so far, the disentangling argument is
supposed to undermine the plausibility of reducing thick concepts to
thin evaluative content plus nonevaluative content. I have argued that
the disentangling argument does not achieve this much. It only suc-
ceeds against two-component reductive analyses that hold the non-
evaluative component of the analysis to be extensionally equivalent to
the thick term (RA1). However, it fails against two-component reduc-
tive analyses that deny the nonevaluative component is extensionally
equivalent to the thick term by denying universalizability and codifi-
ability (RA2). It also fails against reductive analyses that endorse univ-
ersalizability and codifiability but deny that the nonevaluative com-
ponent is extensionally equivalent to the thick term, by allowing that
the nonevaluative meaning component of an analysis of a thick term
does not fully specify the set of nonevaluative properties that make
the application of the relevant thick predicate appropriate (RA3).
Contrary to what some have assumed, then, the disentangling
argument does nothing to show that evaluation and nonevaluation
are so deeply entangled in the content of thick concepts that the
separation a reductive analysis requires is impossible. It thus does
nothing to clarify what this ‘deep entanglement’ is supposed to be. It
is my proposal that we can find such clarification if we turn to what
is cited as the source of the disentangling argument.
28. Compare Elstein and Hurka, “From Thick to Thin,” 521, 526. I am grateful to
Daniel Elstein for helpful discussions about this reductive strategy.
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V. DISENTANGLING AND SHAPELESSNESS (1)
I will continue to use ‘disentangling argument’ to refer to the argu-
ment discussed in the previous section, that is, the argument given
by Williams and Putnam and those others who have written on the
thick. A passage in McDowell’s “Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following”
is commonly cited as the source of this argument.29 In fact, McDowell
himself does not make the disentangling argument as it is set out
above. What he does say, however, will be useful for making clear in
the next section just what it is that nonreductivists about the thick
have to hold.
It is helpful to begin by asking two questions:
1. What is ‘disentangling’?
2. What is the reason for thinking that disentangling is not, or
not likely to be, possible?
Answers to these questions diverge depending on whether we are con-
sidering the (a) disentangling argument or (b) McDowell’s antidis-
entangling remarks. The answers found in b pave the way for an ac-
count of the irreducibly thick.
McDowell uses ‘disentangling’ to refer to separating an evaluative
judgment into two components. The first is sensitivity to a non-
evaluative feature of the world, and the second is a ‘propensity to a
certain attitude’. What thwarts disentangling, McDowell claims, is that
evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively shapeless. By contrast, accord-
ing to the disentangling argument, ‘disentangling’ refers to the re-
ductive analysis of thick concepts into thin evaluation and nonevalu-
ation, and the reason that disentangling is thwarted is that if it were
possible, an outsider would be able to grasp the extension of a thick
term without making any evaluations. But it is not plausible to think
that an outsider would be able to grasp the extension in this way.
Although McDowell does make this point about the graspability of
the extensions of evaluative terms, this is not his primary point, as
will become clear below.
29. John McDowell, “Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following,” inMind, Value, and Reality
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 198–220. Unlike others (see n. 15),
Williams does not cite this article but cites McDowell’s “Are Moral Requirements Hypo-
thetical Imperatives?” (ibid., 77–96) and “Virtue and Reason” (ibid., 50–76) as the sources
of the disentangling argument. Williams says that the idea (which he finds in these articles)
that it might be impossible to pick up an evaluative concept unless one shared its evaluative
interest is basically a Wittgensteinian idea that he first heard expressed by Iris Murdoch
and Philippa Foot in a seminar in the 1950s. In my view, the disentangling argument
found in “Hypothetical Imperatives?” and “Virtue and Reason” does not concern the
acquisition of evaluative concepts, and is distinct from the one in “Non-cognitivism and
Rule-Following.”
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McDowell’s targets in “Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following” are
Hare and J. L. Mackie. He takes them both to hold that values are
not genuine features of the world but are projected by us onto a value-
neutral screen of how things really are. Hare and Mackie, says Mc-
Dowell, are committed to explaining value experience using a dis-
entangling maneuver: they must hold that when we ascribe value to
something, what is actually happening can be disentangled into two
components. Since they think there are no evaluative features in the
world, competence with an evaluative concept must involve sensitivity
to a genuine feature of the world, on the one hand, and a propensity
to a certain attitude that gives that feature of the world the appear-
ance of having the value in question.30
McDowell’s aim is to undermine the Hare/Mackie account of
value experience in general, and he nowhere makes the distinction
between thick and thin evaluative concepts. In the passages that Mc-
Dowell references specifically, Mackie is writing about thin normative
concepts, and Hare about both thick and thin.
Crucially, McDowell’s objective here is not to undermine the pos-
sibility of the reductive analysis of thick concepts, but to undermine
the view that for any evaluative term there must be a corresponding
nonevaluative classification. Hare’s version of this view was that for
any evaluative term there must be a corresponding value-neutral clas-
sification that is a part of the meaning of the evaluative term (the
‘descriptive’ meaning). But Mackie’s view was that, while there must
be such a nonevaluative classification, this is no part of the meaning
of an evaluative term.31 That McDowell takes himself to be undermin-
ing both versions of the view, and that he is concerned with evaluative
concepts in general, thick and thin, should be sufficient to show that
his notion of disentangling is not the notion of disentangling ele-
ments of conceptual content. Thin evaluative concepts, after all, are
not supposed to have any nonevaluative elements to their content.32
The main point of “Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following” is thus
to undermine the plausibility of holding that there are nonevaluative
classifications corresponding to evaluative classifications—whether or
30. McDowell, “Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following,” 200–201. McDowell recognizes
that this projectivist formulation does not strictly fit Hare’s account. However, he says that
the differences between Hare and Mackie are not relevant for the purposes of his article,
and that the disentangling maneuver can easily be redescribed to reflect Hare’s position.
Ibid., 201 n. 7.
31. Hare, Freedom and Reason, chap. 2, esp. secs. 2.4–2.6; J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing
Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1977), 86.
32. McDowell, “Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following,” 200–203, esp. notes 4, 5, 7, 8,
and 10. Of course, none of this should be taken to imply that McDowell’s account, if
successful, does not also undermine the possibility of the reductive analysis of thick con-
cepts.
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not we consider the nonevaluative classifications to be a part of the
meaning of evaluative terms. The antidisentangling remarks are sup-
posed to achieve this.33 It is true that McDowell says that if (his sort
of) disentangling were possible, then an outsider would be able to
grasp the extension of an evaluative term without making any evalu-
ations. But, unlike the disentangling argument, he does not stop at
the graspability point. He goes on to offer a reason why the outsider
will not be able to grasp the extension of an evaluative term without
making some evaluations. We get to what this reason is by thinking
about supervenience.
‘Disentangling’ on McDowell’s view, as I have said, requires that
there are nonevaluative classifications corresponding to evaluative
classifications. And it makes no difference whether the evaluations we
are concerned with are thick or thin. If we allow that evaluative clas-
sifications supervene on nonevaluative classifications, some might
think that this points in favor of disentangling: that supervenience
gives us reason to think that there must be nonevaluative classifica-
tions corresponding to evaluative classifications. According to Mc-
Dowell this would be a mistake:
Supervenience requires only that one be able to find differences
expressible in terms of the level supervened upon whenever one
wants to make different judgements in terms of the supervening
level. It does not follow from the satisfaction of this requirement that the
set of items to which a supervening term is correctly applied need consti-
tute a kind recognisable as such at the level supervened upon. In fact
supervenience leaves open this possibility which is just the possibility
my scepticism [that the disentangling maneuver can always be
brought off] envisages: however long a list we give of items to
which a supervening term applies, described in terms of the level
supervened upon, there may be no way, expressible at the level
supervened upon, of grouping just such items together.34
The idea that there is no matching nonevaluative classification
for an evaluative classification (whether or not it is a part of the mean-
ing of the evaluative term) is the idea that the evaluative classification
is nonevaluatively shapeless. If evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively
shapeless, then disentangling will not be possible, for there will be no
‘genuine feature of the world’ for the outsider to cotton onto. Thus,
the outsider will not be able to succeed in coming to mimic the in-
siders’ practice with regard to a particular evaluative concept. If eval-
33. In the rest of the article, McDowell takes himself to be removing a prejudice,
that is, the prejudice that such nonevaluative classifications are required in order for our
evaluative practice to count as rational.
34. Ibid., 202 (emphasis added).
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uative concepts are shapeless in this way, this explains why it is that
outsiders cannot grasp the extension of a thick term without engaging
with the evaluations of the insiders.
An evaluative concept is nonevaluatively shapeless if there is no
nonevaluative classification corresponding to the evaluative classifi-
cation. It is tempting to think that a classification is something done
by us, something effected by, for example, the predicates we apply to
the world. But this is not all that McDowell has in mind. His claim
is not merely that evaluative classifications may be nonevaluatively
shapeless in the sense that we lack a term for the matching non-
evaluative property (or ‘genuine feature’) that is nonetheless there in
the world: “The point is not merely that the language may lack such
a term, a gap that might perhaps be filled by coining one.” Even if
we were to coin such a term, he says, “such a coinage might not be
learnable except parasitically on a mastery of the full-blown evaluative
expression.”35
What, then, is shapelessness supposed to be? The ‘shape’ of a
concept, we might say, is what all the things falling under the concept
have in common: the unifying feature or the real resemblance.36 If
evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively shapeless, then that unifying
feature or real resemblance is not nonevaluative: it is not simply that
we lack a term for the nonevaluative feature of the world that we are
nonetheless sensitive to in applying our evaluative concept— it is not
there. Evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively shapeless, if McDowell
is correct, because the commonality that unifies instances across a
range of cases of the concept’s correct application is evaluative.37 This
35. Ibid., 202 n. 8. One might think that a crucial challenge to McDowell is why
sharing the relevant evaluative perspective should accommodate the shapelessness prob-
lem. McDowell’s view is that without that perspective the relevant unifying (‘shapely’)
feature is not discernible. The nonreductivist need not adopt McDowell’s particular for-
mulation, however. We can recast this more simply as the point that if one lacks the
evaluative concept, one will be unable to identify instances of the evaluative property. See
Wiggins, Ethics, 334. I thank an editor for pressing me to make this point clear.
36. It may be the case that many nonevaluative predicates that apply in virtue of the
application of other nonevaluative predicates (e.g., ‘animal’) are shapeless at the base
level. However, that is not sufficient to make these predicates shapeless in the sense that
is being discussed here, for the concepts expressed by such predicates do have a non-
evaluative shape: the real resemblance or unifying feature between different instances of
the concepts application is nonevaluative. In the animal case, the shape is the nonevaluative
property of animalhood.
37. Another point in favor of my claim that McDowell is not concerned specifically
with the thick is that this shapelessness point has been used in the debate in metaethics
about the so-called pattern problem, where the focus has been on thin normative concepts.
Compare Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith, “Ethical Particularism and Pat-
terns,” in Moral Particularism, ed. Brad Hooker and Margaret Little (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2000), 79–99; Jonathan Dancy, “Can the Particularist Learn the Difference
506 Ethics April 2011
is nonetheless consistent with supervenience because supervenience
merely requires that there be (that we judge there to be) non-
evaluative differences where there are (where we judge there to be)
evaluative differences between cases. By itself, supervenience cannot
generate the requirement that there be matching nonevaluative classifi-
cations for evaluative classifications.
McDowell’s antidisentangling remarks can thus be recast as fol-
lows: if you hold that values are not genuine features of the world,
you are committed to disentangling. To be committed to disentan-
gling is to hold that correctly making an evaluative judgment has two
components. The first involves detecting a nonevaluative property in
the world; the second involves taking that property to ground the
value in question. Commitment to disentangling thus commits you to
the claim that for every evaluative classification there is a correspond-
ing nonevaluative classification (whether or not you take that non-
evaluative classification to be a part of the meaning of the evaluative
term). If there were such matching nonevaluative classifications, it
would be the case that an outsider could come to mimic the practice
of insiders with regard to a particular evaluative concept, coming to
learn the extension of the concept without engaging with the evalu-
ations the insiders use it to make. But it is not plausible to suppose
that this is possible. Why not? One ready explanation is that the non-
evaluative classification, the nonevaluative property, is not there for
the outsider to detect: evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively shape-
less.38
Clearly nothing has been said that establishes that evaluative con-
cepts are nonevaluatively shapeless.39 At this point, I am merely mak-
between Right and Wrong?” in The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy,
vol. 1, Ethics, ed. K. Brinkmann (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center,
Bowling Green State University, 1999), 59–72; David McNaughton and Piers Rawling,
“Naturalism and Normativity: Descriptivism, Normativity and the Metaphysics of Reasons,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 77 (2003): 23–44; Sabina Lovibond,
“Naturalism and Normativity: Reply to McNaughton and Rawling,” Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society 105 (2004): 187–203; and Brad Majors, “Moral Discourse and Descriptive
Properties,” Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 475–94.
38. Another way to put this point is to say that nonevaluative shapelessness has as a
consequence that evaluative judgments cannot be codified and are not universalizable.
Codification will not be possible, since shapelessness means there can be no (useful) rule
telling us what something has to be like, nonevaluatively speaking, to be courageous.
Universalizability is not possible, for shapelessness means that the features that here are
your reasons for correctly judging the action to be courageous may recur without you
being logically required to make the same judgment. See n. 22.
39. McDowell does not even purport to provide such an argument. But, although
there is no knockdown argument for shapelessness, there is equally no knockdown ar-
gument for nonevaluative shapefulness. As I say below, the rest of “Non-cognitivism and
Rule-Following” is taken up with the attempt to remove a prejudice McDowell sees as
operating against shapelessness.
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ing clear what the notion of shapelessness is. Armed with this notion
of shapelessness, we can now return to making sense of the notion of
the irreducibly thick.
VI. DISENTANGLING AND SHAPELESSNESS (2)
The view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick is the view that
evaluation and nonevaluation are deeply entangled in the content of
thick concepts, and that the content of thick concepts cannot be dis-
entangled into a thin evaluative component (or components) and a
nonevaluative component. As we saw in Section IV, the disentangling
argument did nothing to further the understanding of this view. All
it told us, in effect, was that to grasp the extension of a thick concept,
an outsider needs to engage with the evaluations of the insiders. But
this graspability point works against only one version of the reductivist
view. Two other versions of the reductive analysis of thick concepts
are compatible with the graspability point. Using the shapelessness
claim, however, we are now in a position to see what the nonreduc-
tivist about the thick needs to hold, in addition to the graspability
point, in order to distinguish her view from a reductivist account of
the thick. We can start by comparing her view with the type of account
I labeled RA3.
A. Shapelessness, Irreducible Thickness, and RA3
RA3: x is tactful if and only if x is good and there are properties
P, Q, and R (unspecified) of nonevaluative sort T (specified)
such that x has properties P, Q, and R, and P, Q, and R make
anything that has them good.
RA3 holds that while there is a nonevaluative classification cor-
responding to a thick evaluative term, that nonevaluative classification
is not part of the meaning of the thick term. It is compatible with the
graspability point. According to this account, it would not be impos-
sible for an outsider to grasp the extension of a thick concept without
making any evaluations. It would, however, be very unlikely.
The view that thick concepts are irreducibly thick is distinguished
from RA3 by the shapelessness claim. The defender of the irreducibly
thick is committed to the claim that if a thick concept is irreducibly
thick, then it is nonevaluatively shapeless.40 If a thick concept is irre-
40. I have previously implied that the nonreductivist view of the thick is that all thick
concepts are irreducibly thick. Strictly speaking, however, the defender of irreducible
thickness need not commit herself to the claim that all the concepts that we have termed
thick are irreducibly thick, just that at least some of them are, and those that are are
nonevaluatively shapeless.
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ducibly thick, it will be impossible, and not merely very difficult, for
the outsider to detect a nonevaluative classification corresponding to
the thick evaluative classification. The claim is not merely that such
a classification is not a part of the meaning of the thick term, but
that it is not there in the world to be detected. On this view, what
something must be like in order to be, for example, tactful, cannot
be specified nonevaluatively. It cannot be so specified because what
it is to be tactful is not a matter of having a nonevaluative property.
This means that the nonreductivist about the thick is committed to a
certain view of the nature of properties. I return to this point in Sec-
tion VII below.
If thick concepts are irreducibly thick, however, this is nonethe-
less consistent with there being some rough but not extensionally
equivalent purely nonevaluative characterization of the sort of things
the concept applies to. To that extent, the original outline of the
distinction between thick and thin evaluation that I gave in Section
III above is accurate: thick concepts are more specific than thin con-
cepts. They are so because they narrow down the sorts of things that
the concept can apply to. The defender of irreducible thickness could
thus say “x is tactful if x is of nonevaluative sort T,” where ‘T’ means
“having something to do with having or showing concern for others
feelings.” But, even if we can give such a rough nonevaluative char-
acterization, the nonreductivist is committed to the view that the exact
properties of sort T that make things tactful are nonevaluatively
shapeless, and thus that judgments regarding these properties cannot
be codified, and thus that there is no set of properties of type T with
respect to which judgments that an act is tactful can be universalized.
However, strictly speaking, the nonreductivist about the thick is
not committed to there necessarily being even a rough but not ex-
tensionally equivalent purely nonevaluative characterization of the
sort of thing a thick concept applies to. For one thing, it may be that
we lack the appropriate (nonevaluative) terminology to give this char-
acterization.41 For another, it may be that shapelessness means that
we will be unable to come up with such a nonevaluative classification
that is to function even as a necessary condition for the appropriate
application of the concept. It might be possible to come up with an
example of a tactful action, say, which does not show concern for
41. Compare James Griffin, “Values: Reduction, Supervenience, and Explanation by
Ascent,” in Reduction, Explanations, and Realism, ed. David Charles and Kathleen Lennon
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 297–322; and Joseph Raz, “The Truth in Particularism,” in
Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 218–46. Both argue, though in
different ways, that this point undermines supervenience. I argue below that it possibly
undermines ascriptive supervenience, but not ontological supervenience.
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others’ feelings. The nonreductivist view, however, is compatible with
the thought that we can narrow down the sorts of things that thick
concepts apply to, since we can do this without committing to a non-
evaluative shape for the concept.42
B. Shapelessness, Irreducible Thickness, and RA2
RA2: x is tactful if and only if x is T (where ‘T’ is a nonevaluative
predicate referring to a specific set of nonevaluative properties)
and x is good in virtue of being T, and whether x is good in
virtue of being T is uncodifiably dependent upon context such
that universalizability with regard to T is not possible.
RA2 is compatible with the claim that thick concepts are non-
evaluatively shapeless. To return to Blackburn’s example, ‘fat’ in ‘fat ’f
does not amount to a nonevaluative shape for the concept, for it does
not amount to a matching extensionally equivalent nonevaluative clas-
sification. An outsider who latched onto the fact that every individual
that ‘fat ’ applied to was fat would not thereby be able to master thef
use of ‘fat ’.f
To distinguish her view from RA2, the nonreductivist about the
thick cannot merely claim that thick concepts are nonevaluatively
shapeless. That is, her view cannot be merely that there are no exten-
sionally equivalent matching nonevaluative classifications for thick
concepts since this is compatible with RA2. The nonreductivist’s claim
is that across a range of cases of a thick concept’s application there
need not be a particular nonevaluative property or set of non-
evaluative properties instantiated in each case, even when that does
not amount to a nonevaluative shape for the concept. This is not an
implausible claim; think of all the different actions that can be cou-
rageous, or all the different actions that can be tactful: leaving a con-
versation without drawing attention to oneself can count as tactful,
but so can staying in a conversation and drawing attention to oneself.
Being tactful can involve being polite, but it need not. It may even
involve being impolite: interrupting someone while they are speaking
may be impolite but tactful if it saves them from making the blunder
you realize they are just about to make. (And, of course, politeness
may be an evaluative property.)
This is compatible with saying that, for any particular thick con-
cept, there may be such a nonevaluative property or set of properties
instantiated in each case, as there is in the case of ‘fat ’, where thatf
42. Compare Alan Gibbard, “Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings,” Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 66 (1992): 275–77; Dancy, “In Defense of
Thick Concepts,” 277–78.
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doesn’t amount to a nonevaluative shape for the concept. The non-
reductivist distinguishes her view from RA2 by denying that there
must be such a nonevaluative property or set of properties instan-
tiated in each case.
There is, moreover, an additional feature that distinguishes the
nonreductive view from RA2 (and RA3). To see this, we need to con-
sider a version of the reductive view not yet discussed.
C. Shapelessness, Irreducible Thickness, and RA4
There is still more to do to mark out irreducible thickness, for there
is space for a further reductive analysis.43 Again, I use ‘tactful’ as an
example.
RA4: x is tactful if and only if x is of nonevaluative sort T (spec-
ified) and x has some properties (unspecified) in virtue of being
of nonevaluative sort T and is good in virtue of having those
properties where there is no nonevaluative shape to those prop-
erties across a range of instances of the predicate’s correct ap-
plication.
The defender of irreducible thickness, then, cannot simply rest
her view on the claim that thick concepts are nonevaluatively shape-
less, for RA4 accommodates shapelessness. Nor can she merely add
to this the claim that there are not necessarily any particular non-
evaluative properties instantiated in each instance of the correct ap-
plication of the concept, for RA4 accommodates this point too.
To distinguish her view from RA4, the nonreductivist must make
the further claim that the evaluative content of thick evaluative con-
cepts is not thin evaluation. The nonreductivist about the thick is
committed, in other words, to the claim that there can be evaluation
without thin evaluation. To call an action tactful is to evaluate it. But,
on this view, it is not to evaluate it by calling it tactful as a way of
calling it good, or as a way of indicating that it is good to some extent
in some particular way. The nonreductivist about the thick is com-
mitted to the claim that to call it tactful is in itself an evaluation. I
return to this point in Section VII.
This is not the same as Susan Hurley’s view that thin evaluative
concepts are neither conceptually prior to nor independent of thick
evaluative concepts, but it chimes nicely with that view.44 To be a re-
ductivist about the thick is to hold that thick concepts are reductively
analyzable into a thin evaluative component (or components) and a
43. This analysis is reductive in the sense that it reduces thick concepts to a com-
bination of thin evaluation and nonevaluation.
44. S. L. Hurley, Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989), chap. 2.
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nonevaluative component. This is presumably to hold that the thin is
conceptually more basic and thus prior to the thick, and thus to be
a centralist in Hurley’s terms. To be a nonreductivist about the thick
is to deny the conceptual priority of the thin, and to be a noncen-
tralist in Hurley’s terms.45 However, this is not necessarily to make the
further claim that the thick is prior to the thin. A nonreductivist about
the thick can hold a no-priority view: thick and thin ethical concepts
might be interdependent.46
At this point we can take stock. If thick concepts are irreducibly
thick, then no reductive analysis of any thick concept will be possible.
But this does not mean that there is nothing to be said in the way of
elucidation of irreducible thickness in general (or of particular thick
concepts—but that is not the primary task of this article). From the
above discussion, we can characterize irreducible thickness in the fol-
lowing way:47
1. The concept (e.g., tactful) applies to an object in virtue of
it having features of a certain sort, of which we may be able
to give a rough purely nonevaluative characterization, but
where there is no nonevaluative shape for the concept.
2. The object has features of that certain sort that ground the
relevant property (e.g., makes it tactful) and thus merits the
application of the thick concept.
3. Precisely which features ground the property (e.g., make the
object tactful), and thus make the application of the concept
appropriate, are determined, in a way that cannot be speci-
fied in advance, by evaluation on a case-by-case basis.
Of this account we can say the following: the first condition is
required to distinguish the nonreductivist account from both RA2 and
RA3, as we saw above. The second is required to distinguish nonre-
ductivism from RA4: the object must have features of the relevant sort
that ground the evaluative property; features that make the object,
for example, tactful (thick evaluation), rather than features that make
45. Williams endorses this notion of noncentralism in the context of rejecting re-
ductivism about the thick. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 184 n. 7.
46. Hurley, Natural Reasons, chap. 2. On Hurley’s view, the various ethical concepts
get their sense through their positions in a network.
47. I call this a characterization and not an analysis because the view is that, strictly
speaking (i.e., if we take as criteria of analyses that they be noncircular and that they
involve the breaking down of a concept into simpler elements that together compose the
whole), an analysis of these concepts is not possible.
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the object good (thin evaluation).48 Condition 3 is a further spelling
out of both 1 and 2. “Determined . . . by evaluation on a case-by-case
basis” must be understood both ontologically and epistemically. That
is, whether or not a token action is, for example, tactful will depend
ontologically on the particular nonevaluative features of the case in
context, and there will be no nonevaluative shape for tactful actions
across different token instances. Moreover, the user of the concept
will have to make an evaluative judgment as to whether, for example,
‘tactful’ applies here, which will involve attending to the particular
features of the case, and not applying any general principles, for there
will be no such principles to be applied.
A nonreductivist about the thick is thus both a holist and a partic-
ularist. However, this is not a sufficient condition for nonreductivism—
the positions I labeled RA2 and RA4 would also count as both holist and
particularist, since they deny universalizability and codifiability. In this
context, holism is the view that the features that in this case make an
action tactful may in other cases play no such role, or they may even
make an action tactless. The role that these features play will be de-
pendent on context. Particularism here is the view that there will be
no true and useful general principles telling us what actions have to
be like to be tactful.
VII. IMPLICATIONS
The nonreductivist view as it has been developed here has a number
of implications. I explore some central ones in this section.
A. The Distinction between Thick and Thin
This account of irreducible thickness is likely to be tied to a nonre-
ductive account of the nature of evaluation in general. The nonre-
ductivist is likely to hold that thick and thin evaluative concepts are
both nonevaluatively shapeless. She is also likely to hold that thick
48. I am taking it for granted that evaluative properties are indeed dependent prop-
erties, for example, that something is made tactful in virtue of other, nonevaluative prop-
erties that it has. Since on this view there will be no such thing as the features that make
objects tactful (no single set of features amounting to a nonevaluative shape), this gives
rise to the expression that I employ: that features must be had that ground or make the
object tactful or whatever. Someone might object that this is not sufficiently informative,
since all it amounts to saying is that objects must be tactful for the concept to apply. But
the characterization is not meant as an informative analysis of the concept tactful, or even
as a strategy for the analysis of thick concepts in general, but as an elucidation of the
nature of irreducible thickness.
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concepts are more specific than thin concepts and that the distinction
between thick and thin is a matter of degree.49
But how is this to be captured if she also holds that a thick con-
cept does not necessarily have any nonevaluative content? I suggest
that what the nonreductivist ought to say here is that the distinction
between thick and thin can be drawn in terms of the extent to which
the sorts of things that the concept applies to can be restricted. But
the restriction need not be carried out in nonevaluative terms (it
could involve more specific evaluative terms). The narrower the range
of things that the concept applies to, the thicker the concept.
It is plausible to think that there are almost no restrictions on
what sorts of things can count as good or bad. Perhaps right and
wrong are slightly thicker if they only properly apply to actions.
Ought might be slightly thicker too if it is only properly applied to
actions that agents can perform.50 Cruel, and tactful on the other
hand, are much thicker, for they are only properly applied to the
infliction of suffering and to being sensitive to others’ concerns re-
spectively.51
To illustrate, the particular example I used in the characteriza-
tion of irreducible thickness above was tactful, but the non-
reductivist is likely to say almost the same of a thin evaluative concept,
adjusting conditions 1 and 2 to take account of the wider range of
the concept:
1. The concept (e.g., good) applies to an object in virtue of it
having other features, but where there is no nonevaluative
shape for the concept.
2. The object has features that ground the relevant property
(e.g., makes it good) and thus merits the application of the
thin concept.
3. Precisely which features ground the property (e.g., make the
object good), and thus make the application of the concept
appropriate, are determined, in a way that cannot be speci-
fied in advance, by evaluation on a case-by-case basis.
49. Compare Samuel Sheffler, “Morality through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice
of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,” Philosophical Review 96 (1987): 411–34. I say that it is
likely that the nonreductivist will hold these things, because it may be possible to combine
a nonreductive view of the thick with some other account of the thin.
50. It may seem as though I am now saying that the nonreductivist holds that these
notions have necessary nonevaluative content, and thus that I am denying something I
said above. My claim above though was that the nonreductivist holds that a thick concept
does not necessarily qua thick concept have any nonevaluative content, not that no thick
concept has any necessary nonevaluative content.
51. I take it that for the nonreductivist both ‘suffering’ and ‘sensitivity’ are evaluative
notions.
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B. Supervenience
Does the nonreductivist about the thick deny the supervenience of
the evaluative on the nonevaluative? The answer to this question de-
pends on how supervenience is construed. Two distinctions are rele-
vant here: the distinction between local and global supervenience and
the distinction between ontological and ascriptive supervenience. I
discuss each of these in turn.
The claim that the evaluative locally supervenes on the non-
evaluative is the claim that no two individuals (persons, actions, states
of affairs) can differ evaluatively but not nonevaluatively: if two indi-
viduals are identical in all of their nonevaluative features, they must
be identical in evaluative respects as well.52 Global supervenience ob-
tains if no two possible worlds can differ evaluatively but not non-
evaluatively: two worlds that are nonevaluatively identical must be
identical in evaluative respects as well.
Supervenience, whether local or global, is most commonly held
to be an ontological relation holding between classes of properties.
However, since for the most part the discussion above relied on claims
about supervenience that were supposed to hold for both cognitivists
and noncognitivists, I did not assume that the supervenience in ques-
tion was ontological supervenience.53 Instead, the claims made about
supervenience were neutral between ontological supervenience and
ascriptive supervenience.54 Ascriptive supervenience is the term given
to a relation holding between classes of judgments. In this context,
ascriptive supervenience is the view that, logically speaking, a person’s
evaluative judgments about things (or worlds) cannot differ unless
her nonevaluative judgments about those things (or worlds) differ.55
Given these distinctions—between local and global superveni-
ence and ontological and ascriptive supervenience—it turns out that
52. I will assume that the supervenience in question is strong supervenience, that is,
holding across possible worlds rather than only weakly, that is, within each possible world.
Nothing in the discussion hangs on this assumption, however. (It is possible to extend
the distinction between weak and strong supervenience to ascriptive supervenience: see
Sturgeon, “Doubts about Supervenience,” 59 n. 14.)
53. Noncognitivists are antirealists about the evaluative and so strictly speaking cannot
accommodate an ontological construal of the supervenience claim. See Alan Gibbard,
Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 89.
54. For this terminology and the distinction between ontological and ascriptive su-
pervenience, see Klagge, “Supervenience: Ontological and Ascriptive.”
55. Ibid., 462. I interpret ascriptive supervenience to be the claim that we cannot
make different evaluative judgments about two things/worlds without actually making
different nonevaluative judgments about these two things/worlds. But this is controversial.
Some think that ascriptive supervenience is merely the weaker claim that we at least judge
that there are different nonevaluative judgments to be made in these cases, even if we
are not actually equipped to make them.
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irreducible thickness undermines the plausibility of local superveni-
ence, both ontological and ascriptive. Moreover, if thickness is irre-
ducible, it may also give us reason to doubt that global ascriptive
supervenience obtains. The only kind of supervenience not threat-
ened by irreducible thickness is global ontological supervenience.
Shapelessness, I said above, is compatible with supervenience.
More specifically, it is compatible with global supervenience, for
shapelessness does not require the possibility of two worlds differing
evaluatively without differing nonevaluatively. Shapelessness is not
compatible with local supervenience, however. At least, it is not com-
patible with it unless we understand the local supervenience base to
be the entire world. Typically, however, local supervenience doctrines
work with a conception of a restricted supervenience base. Recall that
local supervenience is the view that no two individuals (persons, ac-
tions, states of affairs) can differ evaluatively but not nonevaluatively:
if two individuals are identical in all nonevaluative respects, they must
be identical in evaluative respects as well. To avoid triviality, this doc-
trine must give some principled way of restricting the supervenience
base of an individual such that it does not include the nonevaluative
features of the entire world in which that individual is situated.
However, if shapelessness is true of thick concepts, then they have
no nonevaluative shape. Shapelessness thus leaves open the possibility
that two individual actions can share all of their nonevaluative prop-
erties (however this is determined) and yet not both be tactful. In the
one case, for example, some feature of the context might make it the
case that the action is no longer tactful.56 We can avoid this result by
widening the supervenience base. However, if shapelessness is the
case, we would have to widen the supervenience base to include the
nonevaluative features of the entire world in which the action is sit-
uated to guarantee that an action identical to this one in all non-
evaluative respects would be identical to it in evaluative respects. But
this would render local supervenience a trivial doctrine. This point
applies to both ontological and ascriptive forms of local superveni-
ence.
Irreducible thickness is entirely compatible with global ontolog-
ical supervenience, but what of global ascriptive supervenience?
Global ascriptive supervenience holds that we cannot make different
evaluative judgments about two worlds without making different non-
evaluative judgments about these worlds, and that two worlds that we
judge to be nonevaluatively identical we must judge to be evaluatively
identical. This requires not merely that there is a nonevaluative sub-
56. Compare Brad Majors, “The Natural and the Normative,” in Oxford Studies in
Metaethics, vol. 4, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 36–40.
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vening base but that we are able to give a complete characterization
of it in nonevaluative terms, that is, a characterization that is sufficient
to “fix” the evaluative.
It seems to me that a nonreductivist about the thick, who holds
that there is no necessary nonevaluative content to evaluative con-
cepts, and who holds that evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively
shapeless, should leave open the possibility that we are not equipped
to give such a complete nonevaluative characterization of the subven-
ing base. I do not have the space here to pursue this point further,
however. For the moment, I merely want to note the interesting result
that, according to the nonreductivist view, there is no guarantee that
global ascriptive supervenience will hold. There is no guarantee, in
other words, that we will be able to make different nonevaluative judg-
ments about two worlds that we make different evaluative judgments
about.
What of the dependence thesis? Nonreductivism about the thick
is compatible with this thesis ontologically construed: that the evalu-
ative depends on the nonevaluative, for evaluative properties must be
grounded in nonevaluative properties. It is consistent with this thesis
because it is consistent with the nonreductivist view that the features
that make actions tactful, say, on a case-by-case basis, are nonevaluative
features. The nonreductivist simply denies that in any particular case
the nonevaluative features making an action tactful are the property of
tactfulness.
Defenders of nonreductivism are not committed to anything that
would require them to deny that in each token case the features that
make an action tactful are nonevaluative features. Things are less
clear if we consider dependence construed ascriptively. There is no
guarantee on the nonreductive view that we will be able to give a
purely nonevaluative characterization of the things the thick concept
applies to, at the level of type, even when that nonevaluative charac-
terization does not amount to a nonevaluative shape for the concept.
Perhaps the nonreductivist can say that it is likely that we will be able
to, for each token case, but there is nothing in the view that guar-
antees that we will.
C. Properties
The nonreductivist view is consistent with the dependence thesis be-
cause it is consistent with holding that the features that make actions
tactful, say, on a case-by-case basis, are nonevaluative features. Because
of shapelessness, however, the nonreductivist denies that in any par-
ticular case the nonevaluative features making an action tactful are
the property of tactfulness. The nonreductivist about the thick is thus
committed to denying that the long disjunction of all the non-
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evaluative features of different instances of tactfulness constitutes the
property of tactfulness.
McDowell does not, strictly speaking, provide an argument for
the claim that evaluative concepts are nonevaluatively shapeless. What
he does do is point out that supervenience leaves open that possibility.
There is no knockdown argument for shapelessness, but apart from
appeal to examples, the defender of the irreducibly thick can supple-
ment her case for shapelessness in a number of ways. One is to defend
an account of properties that rule out disjunctions such as the one
described above from constituting a property.57 Another is to give an
account that makes clear that nonevaluative shapelessness is no bar
to acquiring an evaluative concept, and nor is it a bar to our evaluative
practice counting as rational.58
D. Evaluation
I have left possibly the most interesting set of implications until last.
One part of the nonreductivist account that clearly needs to be
fleshed out in more detail is the claim that thick concepts are them-
selves evaluative, and not evaluative because of any link they have to
thin evaluation. While I do not have the space to explore all of the
implications of this here, it is worth noting what some of them are.
It is commonly assumed that evaluation must be either positive
(good to some extent) or negative (bad to some extent), that is, that
evaluation must have a pro or con flavor. Use of a thick concept that
conveys a positive evaluation is thought to entail ‘good to some extent
or in some respect’, and use of a thick concept to convey a negative
evaluation is thought to entail ‘bad to some extent or in some re-
spect’. Furthermore, it is assumed, this entailment licenses the view
that thick concepts have thin evaluative content. But if thick concepts
are themselves evaluative, and not evaluative because of any link they
have to thin evaluation, then this assumption is not warranted. Decid-
ing that an action is tactful will be a matter of evaluating it, but de-
ciding that it is tactful need not involve deciding that it is good or
bad to some extent. Thick concepts are evaluative in their own right,
on this view, just like thin concepts are.
Of course, this flies in the face of, to use Hume’s words, thick
terms “force an avowal” of their merit or demerit, as the case may be.
57. Much work has already been done on this point. See, e.g., Majors, “Moral Dis-
course,” and Jonathan Dancy, “Nonnaturalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory,
ed. David Copp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 122–43. For a relatively new
account, see Graham Oddie, Value, Reality, and Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009).
58. Compare Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, “Particularism and Patterns,” and Dancy,
“Can the Particularist Learn the Difference?”
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Courage and tact are thought to be necessarily good, cruelty and bru-
tality necessarily bad. But the nonreductivist is on the side of Black-
burn and others who deny that thin evaluation is a part of the se-
mantic content of thick terms.59 Nonreductivism is thus compatible
with the thought that the thin evaluative valence of a thick concept
is variable. This is the claim whether a particular instance of, for ex-
ample, tact is good to some extent, bad to some extent, or neither
will depend on the particular features of the case and will be a matter
for substantive judgment.60
Those who argue that thin evaluative content is not part of the
semantic content of thick terms also argue that thick concepts are not
inherently evaluative. The nonreductivist thus owes us an account of
what it is for a concept or property to be evaluative in the first place.
One potentially fruitful avenue of pursuit would be to consider
essential contestability as a mark of the evaluative, and to pursue the
thought that evaluative concepts, as opposed to nonevaluative con-
cepts, are concepts that characteristically admit of substantive dis-
agreement that cannot be settled by fiat.61 We might find such essen-
tial contestability in nonevaluative domains, but in such cases it is
likely that disputes could be settled by fiat, if settling them is required
for some practical purpose.62 In the case of evaluative concepts, this
is not possible.63 Thick concepts pick out features that matter, nor-
matively speaking, for practical, aesthetic, and perhaps epistemic eval-
uation.64 These are features that have practical, aesthetic, or epistemic
relevance. Precisely what relevance they have will depend, no doubt,
on other features of the context. In advance of a particular case, how-
ever, it is true to say that where thick properties arise, they will be
relevant.
59. Blackburn, “Through Thick and Thin”; Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Ox-
ford: Clarendon, 1998); Va¨yrynen, “Objectionable Thick Concepts.”
60. See Blackburn, “Through Thick and Thin,” and Ruling Passions; Dancy, “In De-
fense of Thick Concepts”; and Jonathan Dancy, Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Clarendon,
2004).
61. Compare Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 8; Hurley, Natural
Reasons, chap. 3, esp. 45–50; and David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1998), 314, 318. I don’t mean to suggest that this would be the only mark of
the evaluative, merely that this would be a good place to start.
62. Compare Hare, Freedom and Reason, 28.
63. It may be that an evaluative matter may have to be settled by fiat, for legal purposes,
for example. But this is not reason to think that the evaluative dispute will have been
settled.
64. Compare Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 129–30, 140. I do not mean
to suggest here that the practical and the aesthetic necessarily exhaust the realm of the
evaluative. There may be epistemic thick concepts that characteristically matter for epi-
stemic evaluation.
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A further potentially fruitful avenue of pursuit would be to spell
out precisely what is involved in what everyone party to the thick
concepts debate seems to accept, namely, ‘evaluation drives exten-
sion’. This would involve a careful account of what it is to share an
evaluative outlook. Finally, the nonreductivist could also pursue the
possibility that there is something distinctive about the “in virtue of”
relation that holds between evaluative properties and their grounds.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There is much that still needs to be done to flesh out and defend the
nonreductive view, as the previous section makes clear. However, there
has been a significant advance on the negative and metaphorical for-
mulation of irreducible thickness that we met at the beginning of this
article.
We can now characterize irreducible thickness positively and less
metaphorically as follows:
1. The concept (e.g., tactful) applies to an object in virtue of
its having features of a certain sort. We may be able to give
a rough purely nonevaluative characterization of the sort
these features belong to in advance, but there is no non-
evaluative shape for the concept. The concept will, however,
have an evaluative shape: all instances of tactfulness will be
tactful, for example.
2. The object has features of that certain sort that ground the
relevant property (e.g., make it tactful) and thus merits the
application of the thick concept.
3. Precisely which features ground the property (e.g., make the
object tactful), and thus make the application of the concept
appropriate, are determined, in a way that cannot be speci-
fied in advance, by evaluation on a case-by-case basis. ‘Deter-
mined by evaluation’ is to be understood both epistemically
and ontologically.
It is now possible to see both why it is that nonreductivists about
the thick deny that all moral judgments can be expressed using a few
thin concepts such as good, bad, right, and wrong (for they hold
2). Sections VI and VII flesh out to some extent what it is they need
to defend in order to uphold this denial. Moreover, we now see the
extent to which irreducible thickness, if it obtains, creates problems
for the idea that the evaluative supervenes on the nonevaluative. Ir-
reducible thickness confounds both local and ascriptive superveni-
ence and may also create obstacles for the thesis that the evaluative
depends on the nonevaluative, where that is construed ascriptively.
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Whether a successful defense of irreducible thickness serves to
undermine the fact-value distinction is more complicated. The fact-
value distinction involves the view that values are not facts in some
full-blooded, realist sense. A successful defense of irreducible thick-
ness would thus undermine the fact-value distinction if it also showed
that antirealists about the evaluative could not be nonreductivists.
The rationality and consistency of evaluative practice is at the
core of the issue of whether a nonreductive account of the thick un-
dermines the fact-value distinction. It is true that irreducible thickness
is most comfortably at home in a realist non-naturalist setting. Non-
evaluative shapelessness is, in that setting, no bar to the existence of
evaluative properties. Rationality and consistency in evaluative prac-
tice are a matter of using evaluative concepts to correctly pick out
evaluative properties. But that this is where irreducible thickness is
most at home should not lead us to assume that no other metaethical
view can accommodate it. While the commitment to shapelessness
and the attendant view of properties rule out certain kinds of natu-
ralist realists from being nonreductivists, it is not clear that it would
necessarily rule out naturalism tout court.65
More importantly, as far as the implications of irreducible thick-
ness for the fact-value distinction go, it has not yet been established
that antirealists cannot be nonreductivists. There seems to me to be
no bar to being both a nonreductivist about the thick and an error
theorist. If there is, however, it will be the same one that is a bar to
noncognitivism: that the commitment to nonevaluative shapelessness
(the denial of universalizability and codifiability) leaves the antirealist
with no way to account for evaluative practice as a process of genuine,
rational, concept application.66 But this issue is far from decided. The
question that needs investigating is whether antirealists can be both
holists and particularists about the thick.
Of course, if nonreductivism about the thick makes trouble for
ascriptive dependence and supervenience, as I have suggested it does,
then it may prove difficult for the noncognitivist to account for de-
pendence and supervenience. But even if a successful defense of ir-
reducible thickness establishes this much, this would not by itself un-
dermine the fact-value distinction. What it would do, as Williams
suspected, is show that any fact-value distinction that there is does not
lie at or near the surface of language.67
65. Compare Dancy, “Can the Particularist Learn the Difference?” and Jackson, Pettit,
and Smith, “Particularism and Patterns.”
66. McDowell, “Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following,” 217. Compare Dancy, “In De-
fense of Thick Concepts,” 272–75; Blackburn, Ruling Passions, 308, 315; and Gibbard,
Thinking How to Live, 106.
67. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 130.
